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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

i

PATRICK ARCHULETA,

i

Case No. 920388-CA

Priority No- 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Patrick Archuleta appeals his conviction for
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)
(Supp. 1992).

The conviction was entered upon a jury verdict in

the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for Sanpete County,
Utah, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, presiding (R. 136, 141-42).
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The State believes that the issues presented by
defendant can be resolved most expeditiously under the waiver or
procedural default principle, as follows:
Does defendant's failure to request an appropriate
remedy, at trial, for the prosecutor's alleged failure to timely
comply with a discovery request, effectively waive his claim, on
appeal, of a prejudicial discovery violation?

This question is

one of law, decided upon de novo examination of the record.

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.6 (Utah 1987); State v.
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
This appeal implicates Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

The specific portions of that rule at issue here—

Rules 16 (a), (b), and (g)—are reproduced in defendant's Brief
of Appellant at 4-5, and will be further set forth, as needed, in
the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person (R. I). 1 At trial, he objected to
the admission of a videotape that showed him committing the
offense (T. 157-58).

The objection was overruled, and the tape

was shown to the jury, which returned a guilty verdict (R. 136).
Pursuant to the verdict, defendant was sentenced to a term of
zero to five years at the Utah State Prison (R. 141-42).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Offense
This appeal arises from a disturbance at the Central
Utah Correctional Facility in Gunnison, Utah, involving defendant
and John Gallegos, both inmates in that facility (R. 1). Much of
that disturbance was recorded by video camera.

The videotape (R.

*Main record references are designated MR.M The transcript of
defendant's May 11, 1992 trial is referenced as MT.M The videotape
includes a visual display of the date and time that will also be
parenthetically referenced as needed. The displayed times are one
hour ahead of the actual times, because the video camera was still
set on daylight savings time when the disturbance was recorded
(video display 11/9/91 at 4:30 PM).
2

152), shows that during the course of the disturbance, defendant
possessed and brandished a broken, rather sharp-appearing piece
of broomstick (video display 11/9/91 at 4:40 to 4:53 PM). At
trial, defendant admitted to possession of the stick (T. 186-92).
Trial Court Proceedings
Well before trial, defense counsel filed a request for
discovery that asked the prosecution to provide to him, among
other things, a copy of the incriminating videotape (R. 8).
Defendant and Gallegos also filed their own pro se discovery
requests (R. 10-16).
No written prosecution response to the discovery
requests appears in the record.

However, a minute entry reflects

that the prosecutor acknowledged the requests at the preliminary
hearing, roughly thirty days after the requests were made, and
agreed to comply (R. 23).
Another fifty days later, but still five days before
trial, a copy of the videotape was provided to defense counsel
(R. 8; T. 159). An additional copy was provided to defendant and
Gallegos; however, Gallegos destroyed that tape (T. 159).
Therefore, while counsel had five days to review the videotape,
defendant himself may not have viewed it until roughly thirty-six
hours before trial (T. 158).
Complaining of the short time provided for his client
to view the videotape, defense counsel objected to its admission
as a trial exhibit.

Through counsel, defendant also objected to

the tape's admission because it contained a seven-minute gap (T.

3

157-58).

The tape recounts that the recording gap was attributed

to a recorder battery change (video display 11/9/91 at 4:40 PM) .
Defendant's objection to the videotape was overruled
(T. 161). Defendant thereafter did not request a continuance or
recess to allow further preparation to meet this evidence.

The

transcript of defendant's objection to the videotape, and the
trial court's resolution of the objection (T. 157-62), is copied
in the Appendix to this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant has waived his opportunity to complain of the
alleged discovery violation on appeal.

Even assuming that a

violation did occur, defendant failed to request a continuance in
6rder to remedy any unfairness such violation may have worked
upon him.

Under well-settled law, this omission operates to deny

him relief on appeal, and his conviction should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT REQUEST APPROPRIATE
MITIGATING RELIEF AT TRIAL, HE HAS WAIVED ANY
COMPLAINT, ON APPEAL, OF PROSECUTORIAL
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH DISCOVERY RULES.
On appeal, defendant complains that the trial court
improperly failed Mto exclude the videotape or to take other
remedial measures," in response to his assertion that the
prosecutor had violated his discovery obligation (Br. of
Appellant at 13, 15 (emphasis added)).

This complaint can be

summarily rejected, because defendant, upon the trial court's
denial of his request to exclude the videotape from evidence,
failed to request any other remedial measures.
4

Even where a violation of prosecutorial discovery
obligations is established, the defendant is obliged to request
relief, in the trial court, to mitigate any resulting harm.
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.6 (Utah 1987); State v.
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990).

Further, the

defendant must request appropriate alternative relief if his or
her request for a harsh sanction is denied.

A failure to request

such alternative relief—typically a trial continuance—
effectively waives any complaint of the discovery violation on
appeal.

See State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989)

(defendant's motion to dismiss, because of prosecutor's discovery
violation, was denied; appellate relief denied where defendant
did not then renew his continuance request); State v. Griffiths,
752 P.2d 879, 882-83 (Utah 1988) (defendant's objection to
admission of his out-of-court statements, not previously
disclosed by the prosecution, was overruled; failure to request
alternative relief waived discovery complaint on appeal).
In this case, defendant objected to admission of the
videotape into evidence, as permitted under Rule 16(g), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for discovery violations.

However,

Rule 16(g) specifies "other, less harsh remedies,"
Christofferson, 793 P.2d at 948, for discovery violations.
Prominent among those remedies is a trial continuance, allowing
the aggrieved party additional time to deal with the tardilyproduced discovery material.

5

Defendant now complains that he and counsel did not
have adequate time to review the videotape together, and to plan
a more effective strategy to rebut this powerful evidence at
trial (Br. of Appellant at 12, 14). However, when his request to
exclude the videotape altogether was denied, defendant failed to
request a continuance, or even a trial recess, which would have
given him additional preparation time.

Having solely asked the

trial court to exclude the videotape, and having not asked for
any less harsh, alternative remedial measure when that request
was denied, defendant has waived his opportunity to complain, in
this Court, of any discovery violation.

On this basis alone, his

conviction should be affirmed.
While defendant's conviction should be affirmed under
the waiver or procedural default principle, it may be worth
noting that the record reveals no explanation for the
prosecutor's long delay in providing the videotape, in response
to defendant's discovery request.

If no such explanation exists,

the State's appellate counsel, like this Court, cannot condone
the prosecutor's tardiness.

Cf.. Christofferson, 793 P.2d at 948.

Even so, that tardiness cannot realistically be said to
have compromised the defense here.

Defense counsel did, after

all, have five days before trial to review the videotape himself
(Br. of Appellant at 7).

With relative ease, he could have then

spoken with defendant by telephone to relate his observations,
and to discuss ways of dealing with the damaging evidence
recorded on the tape.

In fact, defense counsel exploited the
6

videotape's seven-minute gap during his closing trial argument,
impeaching the accuracy of testimonial evidence about the events
that occurred during the recording interruption (T. 213).
Further, it is most difficult to discern how, even if
given generous additional time, defense counsel might have
persuaded the jury that the broken broomstick possessed by
defendant was not a dangerous weapon (cj[. Br. of Appellant at
15).

The videotape shows defendant wrapping his hand with some

type of tape or strip of cloth, possibly fixing the broomstick to
his hand in this fashion.

Then, rather close up, and close to

the plexiglas barrier between himself and the onlooking guards,
defendant is seen brandishing the sharp-appearing broomstick
while complaining about the prison conditions (video display
11/9/91 at 4:40 to 4:53 PM). 2 It would take an extraordinary
magician, dealing with an unusually gullible audience, to conjure
up any reasonable doubt that the broomstick, so used, was a
dangerous weapon.
In short, defendant was not prejudiced by the
prosecutor's delayed response to his discovery request.
2

Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-501(2)(c)
"dangerous weapon" as follows:

(Supp.

Thus

1992) defines

"Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of
its use or intended use is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury. In construing whether an item,
object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon
is a dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument,
object or thing; the character of the wound produced, if
any; and the manner in which the instrument, object or
thing was used are determinative.
The jury was instructed under this definition (R. 109).

7

even if defendant's discoveiy complaint had not been waived on
appeal, he would not be entitled to relief,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this O 1 day of March, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
& .

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to PAUL
R. FRISCHKNECHT, attorney for defendant-appellant, 50 North Main
Street, Manti, Utah 84642, this

^^v

Q * day of March, 1993.
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APPENDIX
Transcript of Defendant's Objection to Admission of the Videotape

PAGE 157
1 II outside the presence of the jury.
2

I'll hear you, counsel.

PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE PROFFER

3

MR. BLACKHAM:

Thank you, Your Honor.

*

Your Honor, the State next intends to offer, as

5

evidence for the jury to view, portions of a video tape that

6

u/as produced while this incident was going on.

7

itself approaches two hours long.

8

intend, nor want to show the entire two hours of this

9

episode to the jury.

The tape

The State does not

We do want to show a portion of the

io

tape, that portion of the tape which would show Mr.

n

Archuleta in possession of this broom stick that's been

12 described all day.
13

I think it's relevant for the purpose of it's

14 showing him being in possession of it, Your Honor, so I want
15 formally proffer that recording and afford counsel any
16 opportunity to object to it, if he desires.

I'm going to

17 have the Court view the same, also, Your Honor, before the
is

jury.

19

THE COURT:

Any objection, Counsel?

20

MR. FRISHCKNECHT:

I do, Your Honor.

I object to

21

the tape, in any of its portion, being shown to the jury for

22

two reasons.

The testimony that has been heard, Your Honor,

23 with regard to a portion of the broom stick in Mr.
24 Archuleta's hand directed toward Officer Taylor, is for
25 whatever reason missing from the tape.

It's not on the
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tape.

There is about a seven-minute block of the tape that

is just nonexistent, during which time it u/as supposedly or
allegedly when the broom handle u/as in Mr. Archuleta's hand,
directed toward Officer Taylor, and the threatening
statement made.
The other ground which I object to showing any
portion of the tape to the jury, Your Honor, is that the
defendant was not able to view the tape himself until
Saturday night at 9:00 o'clock.

That has meaning, Your

Honor, because that affords me from Saturday night until
Monday morning an unreasonably short period of time in which
to deal with that and prepare the defense with my client.
The motion for discovery—Your Honor, I was appointed in
this case on the 5th day of February and I made a motion for
discovery which specifically addressed tapes on the 14th day
of February.

I was not able to view it or get it in my

possession until last week, about Tuesday or Wednesday.
Primarily because Mr. Archuleta didn't see it till Saturday
night, that's an unreasonable lack of sufficient amount of
time in which to prepare the defense, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

You saw it last Tuesday, or Wednesday?

MR. FRISHCKNECHT: Yes.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. BLACKHAM:

Your Honor, the portion of the

video which we intend to have the jury view is that portion
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1

of the video that there has been testimony u/ith about him

2

having the broken broom stick and vyrapping something around

3

his hand to stabilize it.

4

u/hich u/e desire the jury so to see as corrobative of the

5

testimony, Your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

It's that portion of the video

Now it's my understanding—did I

7

understand this, that you told me earlier in Chambers that

8

you did make this tape available to Mr. Gallegos,—

9

MR. BLACKHAM:

10
11

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

— b u t Mr. Gallegos destroyed the tape

in the machine?

12

MR. BLACKHAM:

The tape u/as delivered by my office

13

to Mr. Frischknecht last Tuesday, Your Honor, for his

14

purposes.

15

in the prison so they could see it themselves, independently

16

of u/hat Mr. Frischknecht had access to.

17

State really u/ent above and beyond, Your Honor, u/hat u/e

18

needed to do.

19

A copy u/as then made for the inmates to vieu/ here

So I think the

We made another copy so that they could have a

20

copy, as u/eil as Mr. Frischknecht have one, himself, to

21

vieu/.

22

Evans here advised me, Your Honor, that in that process of

23

the inmate's viewing itf while the guard u/as called to

24

ansu/er a telephonef that inmate Gallegos hurried and grabbed

25

the tape and destroyed that particular copy of it; am I

That u/as provided for them, Your Honor.

Investigator
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correct, Investigator Evans
MR. EVANS:

That's my understanding, Your Honor,

yes.
MR. BLACKHAM:

And I don't know hou/ much of the

tape had been viewed before that, Your Honor, whether
they—I don't believe they had got through it all.

But it

u/as given them and given an opportunity, and that copy of
the video tape u/as destroyed by inmate Gal legos.
MR. FRISHCKNECHT:

Well, in response to that, Your

Honor, my client shouldn't suffer because of Gallegos's
conduct of breaking the tape up. My client shouldn't be
prejudiced because of that.

But to have, Your Honor,

roughly 30 plus hours to view the tape, and then have a
Sunday between then and the trial date, I just don't think
that's fair, Your Honor.
MR. BLACKHAM:

Well, Your Honor, and I--

MR. FRISHCKNECHT:
MR. BLACKHAM:

And let m e ~

Okay.

MR. FRISHCKNECHT:

Go ahead, Paul.

Excuse me.

I think it prejudices my client, Your Honor.

What

all the testimony primarily has been about is the threats
that he made with that broom handle in his hand.

We don't

have that on the tape.
THE COURT: Well, that's something you can argue
about, isn't it?
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1 II

MR. FRISHCKNECHT:

W e l l , if it comes to that, I

2

certainly intend t o , Your H o n o r , but because t h a t f s

3

primarily u/hat the thrust of the evidence h a s been and then

4

w e show a tape that shou/s something else and doesn't even

5

shou; u/hat this case is all about, I think that prejudices my

6

client.

7

THE COURT:

8

Did you have something further?

9

MR. BLACKHAM:

io

THE COURT:

11

All right.

I'm ready, Your Honor.

Well the objection is overruled.

he would destroy a tape?

12

Thank you.

MR. BLACKHAM:

Why

That's tough.
Your H o n o r , I u/ould also proffer a

13

testimony that I u/ould call the officer w h o u/as operating

14

the m a c h i n e , to identify this is the correct tape.

15

you u/ant to h e a r , maybe u/e ought to hear that, preliminary

16

to the jury.

17

THE COURT:

I don't think so.

And if

Bring the jury

is

back, call the officer and identify and shou/ the tape.

19

Could you bring the jury back.

20
2i

MR. BLACKHAM:

Your H o n o r , I don't know.

I guess

u/e c o u l d su/ing t h i s T V a r o u n d —

22

[INDICATED MONITOR MOUNTED O N COURTROOM W A L L ]

23

— a n d I guess they could see that.

I'm a little bit

24

concerned that In case they've got bad vision, like I d o ,

25

that—
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THE COURT:

You can ask them.

MR. BLACKHAM:
THE COURT:

Okay.

How long is it?

It u/as only a couple

of minutes, u/asn't it?
MR. BLACKHAM:

It will be shorter than that.

Probably two minutes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

[JURY RETURNED TO COURTROOM]
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED WITH JURY
THE COURT:

The record should indicate the jury

has returned.
You can call your next witness, please.
MR. BLACKHAM:
THE COURT:

Officer Wayne Larsen.

Will you raise your right hand and be

sworn, please.
(WITNESS SWORN]
WAYNE LARSEN. called and sworn at the instance of
plaintiff, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BLACKHAM:
1

Q

Officer Larsen, please state your name and your

occupation please.
A

I'm Wayne Larsen, and I'm a correctional

supervisor for the Department of Corrections.
2

Q

Were you on duty the afternoon of November 9th,

